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REFORMING THE LAW TO RESPECT




The case of Thomas S. v Robin Y has engendered conversa-
tions of tremendous significance to the lives of lesbian and gay
people and our families. This Essay joins in the rich dialogues
created by the parties, amici, trial and appellate courts and members
of the lesbian and gay community.
One way to discuss this case is to analyze the relative degrees
of truth of various assertions and conclusions made by different
speakers. For example, was there, or was there not, regular
telephone contact between Thomas S. and Ry prior to this lawsuit?
Another mode of discourse is an analysis of the meaning of various
assertions and conclusions, or the weight to be assigned to them.
For example, of the many facts included in the voluminous briefs,
the majority of the appellate division notes that Thomas S. brought
congratulatory flowers when Ry was born, while the dissenters note
that Thomas S. "was not present when Ry cut her first teeth, started
to walk, was sick or needed parental comfort or guidance."2 Yet,
another mode of inquiry considers the relative legal importance of
" Staff Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union - National Lesbian and Gay
Rights Project. Although the ACLU submitted an amicus curiae brief to the First
Department of the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court in
the Thomas S. case, the author was not one of the attorneys on that brief and the
views expressed in this Essay are his alone. The author would like to thank
Laura Ryan for her invaluable insights into parenting and the creation and
maintenance of loving family relationships.
Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1st Dep't 1994).
2 Id. at 363 (Ellerin, J., dissenting).
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various facts, such as the role of biology, in establishing paternity
and the question of what legal status "functional parents" should be
afforded.
As the case of Thomas S. unfolds, and as others like it arise,
these inquiries will necessarily continue, and we all have a
responsibility to engage in them to help shape the law and fairly
order our lives. This Essay considers the context of the conflict and
offers proposals for reforming the law to respect the families
created by lesbian and gay people.3
Part I of this Essay considers the context of families created by
lesbian and gay people, addressing first, the need for respect for
these families and second, the ways in which semantic choices
reveal varying degrees and natures of such respect. Part II of this
Essay calls for reforming the New York statute governing artificial
insemination4 to cover lesbians. Part III of this Essay calls for
equal access to anonymous artificial insemination for lesbians.
BACKGROUND OF THOMAS S. v. ROBIN Y
Robin Y, Sandra R. and Thomas S. orally agreed that Thomas
S. would serve as a known sperm donor, Robin Y would be
artificially inseminated with that sperm, and the child born by this
process would be jointly raised by Robin Y and Sandra R.5 The
parties also agreed that Thomas S. would be available to meet the
child if she became curious about her origins.6 Ry was born in
1981.' When Ry was five years old, Robin Y and Sandra R.
' The author uses the term "families created by lesbian and gay people" as
the broadest description of all of the many different relationships and clusters of
relationships formed by lesbians, gay men, children and other adults. The
category is not limited to families including children with a lesbian and a gay
male as biological progenitors.
4 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1988) [hereinafterDRL § 73]. The
term "artificial insemination" is used in this Essay to reflect its use in statutes
and case law, though "alternative insemination" is a more appropriate way of
describing the procedure which is in no way "unreal."
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arranged for her to meet Thomas S.' Over the next six years, while
Robin Y and Sandra R. served as Ry's day-to-day caregivers, they
permitted Ry to develop a relationship with Thomas S., though all
interactions were at their discretion.9 Following a disagreement
with Sandra R. and Robin Y over the nature and extent of his
relationship with Ry, Thomas S. initiated an action in Family Court
of the City of New York seeking a declaration of paternity and an
order of visitation with Ry.10
Robin Y and Sandra R. opposed the action, and after twenty-
six days of hearings, Family Court Judge Edward Kaufmann
decided against Thomas S., holding that he was equitably estopped
from being issued an order of paternity and an order of visita-
tion." Thomas S. appealed, and the Appellate Division, First
Department, reversed in a three to two decision. The court held that
Thomas S. was entitled to a declaration of paternity and remanded
the case to a different family court judge for a hearing on the issue
of visitation. 2
I. CONTEXT
A. Respecting the Families Created by Lesbian and Gay
People
The law cannot accurately or adequately govern peoples' lives
if it is not guided by an understanding of the nature of those lives.
The fact that lesbian and gay people are suitable to be parents is far
from universally acknowledged in our culture, including our legal




" Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 157 Misc.2d 858, 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1993).
12 Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1st Dep't 1994).
13 See, e.g., S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)
(denying custody based on parents' sexual orientation); Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479
N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1992) (restricting lesbian mother's visitation rights with her
child, stating that "[u]ntil such time that she can establish, after years of therapy
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of the families being created by lesbian and gay people: families
that may include two parents of the same gender, with or without
additional involvement in the child's life by other adults who may
or may not be biological progenitors of the child. Judges and
legislators must begin to respect individual autonomy with regard
to reproductive choice and family decision making.
The freedom to create intimate family relationships without
interference from the state is protected as a critical component of
liberty and autonomy. As the U.S. Supreme Court has held, the
right to intimate association "reflects the reality that individuals
draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with
others. Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state
interference therefore safeguards the ability to independently define
one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty.' 14 By
respecting the choices of adults who decide to have children and
create families, the law reduces the likelihood that there will be
substantial or irreconcilable differences as to the rearing of the
children.
One example of such understanding and respect can be found
in In re Adoption of Evan. 5 In this case, a lesbian couple, one
member of which was the biological progenitor of the child, sought
a second-parent adoption so that both would have a legally
recognized relationship with the child. Surrogate Preminger
recognized and acted to protect the child's family reality-his
"strong parental bond with both" his lesbian mothers, one related
to him biologically and one not.1 6
A compelling example of the absence of respect for the families
created by lesbian and gay people can be found in the amicus
curiae brief of the Council for Equal Rights In Adoption ("CERA")
and demonstrated conduct, that she is no longer a lesbian living a life of
abomination (see Leviticus 18:21) she should be totally stopped from contamina-
ting these children").
"4 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984); see also
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (freedom of personal
choice in matters of family life is one of the liberties protected by due process).
"s 153 Misc.2d 844, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sur. Ct. 1992).
16 The known sperm donor had "explicitly waived" his parental rights. Id.
at 845, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
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filed with the appellate division in the Thomas S. case.' 7 From the
perspective of advocates for "the preservation and reunification of
families," CERA argues for seeking sweeping adoption reform that
stresses biological ties. 8 CERA suggests that these principles
developed in the context of adoption apply in the Thomas S. case,
and CERA supports legal intervention to recognize and further a
relationship between Thomas S. and Ry. However, CERA fails to
consider its principles in the context of families created by lesbian
and gay people.
The ultimate result of many of CERA's suggestions would be
to make it impossible for lesbian and gay people to create families.
For example, CERA claims that there is an "innate right to have a
father who is a real person."' 9 Such a right would require all
lesbian mothers to make a sperm donor a "real person," ostensibly
by recognizing the donor as the child's biological progenitor and
fostering some kind of relationship between the donor and child.
CERA evidently maintains that a woman's autonomous right to
create a family without a male participant or "father" involved
beyond the act of donating sperm is insignificant. If a relationship
between donor and child is required, is there any way that a donor
would not be granted parental rights, thereby making it possible for
women to raise children alone or together without a man?20
To be effective and just, the law must be shaped and applied in
ways that accurately reflect people's lives. In cases of families
created by lesbian and gay people, this principle requires judges
and legislators to understand that families may have one parent or
two parents of the same gender.
" Amicus Curiae Brief of Council for Equal Rights in Adoption ("CERA"),
Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1st Dep't 1994) (No. 51466)
[hereinafter CERA Brief].
Id at 1-4.
I9 d. at 30-31 (quoting ANNETrE BARAN & REUBEN PANNAR, LETHAL
SECRETS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DONOR INSEMINATION 160-161 (1989)).
20 CERA's lack of respect for lesbian and gay people and their families is
also evidenced by their insensitive use of language. For example, CERA
describes artificial insemination as a "second-best solution" for couples
(presumably heterosexual) who have been unable to conceive through (in
CERA's term) "natural" means. Id at 2, 28. CERA also describes people who
use donor insemination as being unable to create "natural" families. Id. at 28.
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B. Naming
The language used by the various speakers in conversations
about the Thomas S. case reveals much about the degree and nature
of respect afforded to families created by lesbian and gay people.
The names that are used are revealing.2" For example, describing
Thomas S. as Ry's "father" begs the question of whether an order
of filiation22 should be issued. Yet, many writers in this case
collapsed the statuses of sperm donor and father, suggesting that
sperm donors are entitled to full parental rights, even though that
was an issue to be decided.23 In addition to assuming that a male
biological progenitor is necessarily a father, many assumed that the
child could not understand that these can be two different things,
for example, that she could have a male biological progenitor who
was not a father. 4
21 Who are the people involved in this dispute and who are they in relation
to each other? Thomas S. is given a wide range of names by the parties, the
amici, and the parents including: "sperm donor"; "semen donor"; "paternal
biological progenitor"; "natural parent"; "biological father"; "purported father";
"close family friend"; "surrogate uncle"; "known father"; "gay father"; "father";
"Petitioner"; and the "man whom [Ry] had called 'Dad."'
Robin Y. is: "mother"; "lesbian mother"; "birth mother"; one of Ry's "two
mothers"; and "Respondent."
Sandra R. is: the "mother's lifetime companion"; one of Ry's "two
mothers'; the "second parent"; the "domestic partner"; and Ry's "full mother."
Ry is: Thomas S.'s "daughter" and Cade's "sister."
Cade is: "Sandra's child."
22 An order of filiation is made by a court or judge having jurisdiction,
fixing the paternity of a child born out of wedlock upon a given man and
requiring him to provide for its support. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1097 (6th
ed. 1990).
23 Even short of equating sperm donation with parenthood, some writers
seemed to have been attempting to create a rhetorical flourish by making
statements such as "there is no doubt [Thomas S.] is the biological father" and
"the tests show 99.9% probability of paternity." Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618
N.Y.S.2d 356, 358 (1st Dep't 1994). Of course, restating that Thomas S. was the
sperm donor does not answer the question of what rights the sperm donor has in
this case.
24 The appellate division held that Thomas S. is "known to the child as her
father," and commented that "Ry has known petitioner to be her father since age
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The question of whether a sperm donor is a "father" has been
addressed by courts and commentators. For example, the court in
People v Sorenson held that
[a] child conceived through. . . artificial insemination does
not have a "natural father," as that term is commonly used.
The anonymous donor of the sperm cannot be considered
the "natural father," as he is no more responsible for the
use of his sperm than is the donor of blood or a kidney."
One commentator endorsed this analogy, suggesting that "[tihe
donor's contribution is impersonal, indeed mechanical . . .. The
donor is less akin to a biological parent in an adoptive relationship
than to a contributor of blood to a needed and wanted transfu-
sion.,2 6 Another commentator noted, "The law has viewed the
paternity of children conceived by artificial insemination as a thing
apart from ordinary notions of biological fatherhood."" Some use
the term "parent" as distinct from father, suggesting that fatherhood
entails the giving of sperm, whereas parenthood entails taking part
in the raising of a child.2"
Of course there are other views as to the nature of "fathers" and
"fatherhood." Some have argued that all biological progenitors,
including semen donors, have the duties of "fatherhood" and cannot
abrogate such duties, even though it may currently be morally and
three and [the order of paternity] will therefore be no shock to her sensibilities."
Id. at 357, 362. CERA declares that "S. is in fact Ry's biological father," that Ry
"has known [this] since she was three years old," and that Ry "is being lied to."
CERA Brief, supra note 17, at 6. Others argue that Ry understands her biological
reality. See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of National Center for Lesbian Rights et al.,
Thomas S. (No. 51466).
25 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968).
26 Joan H. Hollinger, From Coitus to Commerce: Legal and Social
Consequences of Noncoital Reproduction, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 865, 922
(1985).
27 JOHN P. MCCAHEY ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION LAW AND
PRACTICE 1-67 (1993).
21 Of course, calling someone in Thomas S.'s position the "sperm donor"
instead of the "father" cannot change the fact that society attaches tremendous
significance to biological connections. However, by allowing society to focus on
biology, one fails, in some situations, to recognize and respect the relationships
and families created by lesbian and gay people.
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legally acceptable to do so.2 9 The trial court decision denying
Thomas S.'s petition for a declaration of paternity has been
described as "leav[ing] the child with no legal father . ,. 0One
amicus in Thomas S. described Thomas S. as "by all accounts a
good father to his daughter."'" Of course this is not "by all
accounts"--Robin Y and the dissenting Appellate Division judges
and certain amici vigorously assert that he has never been a father
of any sort to Ry.
The disjunction between the legal and the linguistic makes the
question of fatherhood far from simple. There are sperm donors or
biological progenitors who may or may not have parental rights and
there are persons with parental rights who may or may not be
biological progenitors. "'[F]atherhood' or 'paternity' is a legally,
socially, and politically defined relationship, not a biological
fact."32 By adopting a child, a man may become a father despite
the lack of a biological connection. On the other hand, a man who
is the biological progenitor of a child may be legally excluded from
fatherhood by operation of an artificial insemination statute,
adoption, or if the mother was married to someone else and an
applicable statute prohibits his attempt to gain an order of pater-
nity.
33
Other terms in addition to "father" are subject to similar
analysis. For example, the majority recognized the relationship
between Robin Y and Sandra R., according it status by naming
them as "lifetime companion[s]" and "domestic partners., 34
Similarly, the relationship between Ry and Cade35 is recognized
and accorded status by their naming as "sisters., 36 The
" Daniel Callahan, Bioethics and Fatherhood, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 735, 739-
41(1992).
30 MCCAHEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 1-72 (1993).
3' Amicus Curiae Brief of the Lesbian and Gay Parenting Group and Gay
Fathers Group at 13, Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1st Dep't 1994)
(No. 51466).
32 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 1991 WL 57753, at *2 (Sup. Ct. June 18,
1991).
33 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
34 Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 357, 360.
3' The biological daughter of Sandra R.
36 Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
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relationship among Robin, Sandra, Ry and Cade is recognized and
accorded status by their naming as "the R.-Y family."'3 The one
relationship between members of the R.-Y family which the
majority does not recognize is that between each child and her non-
biological mother.38
The differences in naming represent variations in understanding
and beliefs about the roles that people play. To treat lesbian and
gay people and the families that they create fairly, these families
must be understood and respected.
II. REFORMING NEW YORK'S ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
STATUTE
Section 73 of New York's Domestic Relations Law ("DRL")
provides that when a wife and husband sign a written statement
agreeing to conceive a child through artificial insemination using
a donor's sperm, and a physician performs the insemination, the
husband is deemed to be the legal father for all purposes.39
Implicit in the statute is the result that the sperm donor, who could
7 Id. at 358.
3 Perhaps recognizing the mother-child relationship between Sandra and Ry
by naming it would seem to the majority to weaken its determination that
Thomas S. is Ry's father.
In an interesting aside, the appellate division recommends "therapy to
reestablish the relationship of Ry and her father." Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at
362. The suggestion here, and elsewhere in the majority decision, is that Robin
and Sandra pushed Thomas S. out of his role as father in part by denying him
that name, which the court, by its order of filiation, restores. The court then turns
to psychotherapy to relocate the actors back into the roles to which they have
been (re)assigned.
39 1. Any child born to a married woman by means of
artificial insemination performed by persons duly authorized
to practice medicine and with the consent in writing of the
woman and her husband, shall be deemed the legitimate,
natural child of the husband and his wife for all purposes.
2. The aforesaid written consent shall be executed and
acknowledged by both the husband and wife and the
physician who performs the technique shall certify that he
had rendered the service.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73.
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be anonymous or known, is forever barred from asserting paternity
despite his biological connection to the child. Operation of the
statute results in a legal reality that should accurately reflect the
intended family reality-a donor with no parental rights and
responsibilities, and two adults with parental rights and responsibili-
ties.
The limitation of New York's artificial insemination statute to
situations involving husbands and wives must be cured in order to
respect the families created by lesbian and gay people.40 Like the
New York statute, the Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA") speaks only
in terms of married women and their husbands.4' The UPA, as
adopted by California, Colorado and Wyoming, however, omits the
term "married," thereby affording its protections to unmarried
women, including lesbians.42 To cure this defect in the New York
statute, legislation should be enacted to allow unmarried women to
gain protection from claims by known sperm donors.43
40 The Practice Commentary to DRL § 73 notes that the statute applies only
to the insemination of married women. There is no comparable legislation, as
yet, where the woman who is inseminated has a romantic, but nornarital,
relationship with a man other than the sperm donor. The statute was plainly
designed to protect a husband from a claim by his wife that he gave oral consent.
The legislature, by insisting upon a formal writing, sought to avoid the inevitable
credibility issue that arises in cases of claimed oral consents. Thus, where the
wife claims that the consent was oral and the husband denies having given such
consent, DRL § 73 should be construed as requiring rejection of the husband as
the father of the child. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (Practice Commentary).
41 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1994).
42 CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1994) (repealed 1994); COLO. REv.
STAT. § 19-4-106 (1994); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1977); Jhordan C. v. Mary
K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo.
1989). In R.C., the court interpreted the omission of the word "married" from the
statute as indicating an intent to permit unmarried as well as married women to
share in the protection of the statute. See also McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239
(Or. 1989) (noting that one purpose of the statute was to allow unmarried women
to conceive without sexual intercourse), review denied, 784 P.2d 1100 (Or.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1924 (1990).
' The Practice Commentary to DRL § 73 notes that the rights of known
donors in cases not covered by the statute "needs to be addressed, either by
obtaining a waiver of rights from the sperm donor prior to insemination or by
remedial legislation." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (Practice Commentary).
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As an alternative to the enactment of such legislation, DRL
section 73 should be expansively interpreted by courts to cover
unmarried women. In general, DRL section 73 has been strictly
interpreted by the courts." For example, in Anonymous v
Anonymous,45 the court held that only strict compliance with the
formalities required by DRL section 73 creates an irrebuttable
presumption that the husband is the father of the child. However,
depending on the situation presented, a strict interpretation of the
statute may not always be appropriate, as the DRL Practice
46Commentary notes.
Thomas S. argued that DRL section 73 was not applicable
because Robin Y was an unmarried woman, and therefore not
covered by the plain language of the statute. There is, however, no
basis for a distinction between married and unmarried women and,
any imposition of such a distinction serves to deprive lesbians-as
well as non-lesbian unmarried women-from the benefits of the
statute. The argument that married and unmarried women are not
similarly situated47 does not provide a sound basis because it rests
entirely on a specious interest in supporting the goals of certainty
and stability in those families which include a marriage relationship
and not supporting the goals of certainty and stability in families
which do not include a marriage relationship. The affirmative goal
44 See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 151 A.D.2d 330, 542 N.Y.S.2d 586
(1 st Dep't 1989) (holding that a husband could challenge the paternity of a child
conceived by his wife through artificial insemination without his written
consent).
45 Id.
46 At first blush, the court's insistence on strict compliance with DRL § 73
may seem unduly rigid. Where oral consent or defective written consent is
clearly given, there seems to be little reason to follow form over substance. But
as the court noted in Anonymous, the statute is designed, at least in part, to
protect husbands against contrived claims of consent. The strict approach taken
in Anonymous may well have been appropriate under the particular circumstances
presented: the court found that the husband did not know of the particulars of the
insemination and had not promised, prior to conception, to assume responsibility.
However, it may be less appropriate to apply the strict compliance test to other
circumstances. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (1991 Practice Commentary).
"' See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).
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should be to provide all women with a high degree of personal and
family autonomy, not just those women who are married to men.
DRL section 73 should "not rest on fictitious legal distinctions
... , but should find its foundation in the reality of family life. 4
While DRL section 73 may provide certainty to husbands and
fathers in the artificial insemination process, it also provides
certainty to mothers, donors and children. To fail to recognize the
relationships in families created by lesbian and gay people would
be to fail to effectuate the statute.49
" Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201,209, 543 N.E.2d 49, 53, 544
N.Y.S.2d 784, 789 (1989) (holding that surviving gay life partner is a "family"
member for purposes of rent control regulation).
49 The physician requirement of DRL § 73 is another issue ripe for
examination by the courts and legislature. It is widely recognizedthat a physician
is not required for the process of alternative insemination. See, e.g, Jhordan C.,
179 Cal. App. 3d at 393-94. However, even recognizing this, courts have
interpreted statutes including such a requirement strictly, holding that donor's
parental rights are not extinguished by an artificial insemination statute because
a physician was not used. Id. at 392. In Jhordan C., the court held that the
statute reflects the legislature's conscious adoption of the physician requirement,
and found that the requirement safeguards health (by allowing the physician to
take the donor's medical history and to screen for hereditary and communicable
diseases) and helps to formalize the insemination procedure. Id. at 393.
The initial draft of the model UPA did not contain a provision
requiring physician supervision of the artificial insemination process.
However, the drafters ultimately chose to condition the model UPA's
applicability to situations supervised by licensed physicians, no doubt
in consideration of the inherent risks to all participants in the process,
including the child. (citations omitted). In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 36
(Colo. 1989) (Kirschbaum, J., concurring).
Reasons against the physician requirement include the woman's right to
privacy and autonomy, the cost of physician involvement and a preference for
performing artificial insemination at home.
In several states, it is illegal to perform artificial insemination without a
physician. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-772 (1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-
34-26 (1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 551 (West 1989); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 677.360 (1993). Interestingly, in Oregon, a court refused to read a physician
requirement into the artificial insemination statute governing the donor's rights,
even though another Oregon statute required the use of a physician in the
process. See McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 241-43 (1989).
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III. ENSURING ACCESS TO ANONYMOUSLY DONATED SPERM
Lesbians should not be forced to confront the myriad of issues
raised by using a known sperm donor unless they so desire. There
can be benefits to knowing the identity of the sperm donor: (1)
medical information and history can be useful to address health
problems that the child might face; (2) some children may wish to
know the identity of the donor; and (3) women may be better able
to screen the sperm because some sperm banks may be unreli-
able.5° Yet, discriminatory practices have made access to anony-
mously donated sperm difficult for lesbians in many situations. To
respect the personal and family autonomy rights of lesbians, such
discriminatory practices must be prevented.
Anonymous insemination helps to create a predictable scenario
for everyone involved. Members of the new family do not need to
be concerned that the donor may at any point seek to assert a legal
relationship.5 Donors are assured that they will not be subjected
to the rights and responsibilities of parenthood.
Many sperm banks will not provide services to lesbians and
other unmarried women.52 For example, some staff members at
the University of Washington's infertility clinic refused to assist
Another important reason for abolishing the physician requirement, is the
fact that physicians often discriminate against lesbians and single women,
refusing to assist them with artificial insemination. See infra notes 52-56 and
accompanying text.
50 In one extreme example, a physician used his own semen to inseminate
married women after telling couples that he had matched the husband's physical
traits and religious preference up with an anonymous donor. See JULIA J. TATE,
ARTIFIcIAL INSEMINATION AND LEGAL REALITY 2 n.1 (A.B.A. 1992) (citing a
1987 survey by Congress' Office of Technology Assessment).
"' "[S]perm banks routinely require sperm donors to waive any and all rights
that may follow from a successful insemination." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73
(Practice Commentary).
52 See Carol A. Donovan, The Uniform Parentage Act and Nonmarital
Motherhood-By-Choice, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 193, 196 (1983);
see also Developments in the Law - Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1508 (1989).
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single women and lesbians with artificial insemination. 3 In a
judicially reported decision, a sperm bank refused to assist an
unmarried heterosexual couple with artificial insemination, so the
couple performed the procedure at home without physician
assistance. 4 The situation was recently described as "widespread
reluctance of physicians, who, by and large, control artificial
insemination, to perform AID55 upon single, particularly lesbian,
women ... [which creates] a barrier to a woman's success in
achieving that goal."56
Access to anonymous artificial insemination must be made
equally to lesbians and single women as to married heterosexual
women. State and local laws which prohibit discrimination by
public accommodations on the basis of marital status or sexual
orientation should be aggressively enforced to gain such access for
lesbians. Specific legislation governing non-discrimination by
providers of artificial insemination should be considered and
evaluated. Finally, regulatory oversight of artificial insemination
should be used to prevent unfounded distinctions based on sexual
orientation or marital status which acts as a barrier for lesbians in
obtaining anonymously donated sperm.
5 Warren King & Carol M. Ostrom, U W. Clinic Split Over Fertility Help
for Singles: Some Staff Won't Help Lesbians, Unmarried Women Conceive,
SEATTLE TIMEs, Nov. 11, 1993, at Al.
" C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (N.J. Cumberland Co. Ct. 1977). In 1980, the
American Civil Liberties Union, on behalf of an unmarried woman, challenged
a policy of Wayne State University's Mott Clinic, which allowed only married
women to apply for artificial insemination. The clinic agreed to change its
policy. Donovan, supra note 52, at 196.
" Artificial insemination using a donor's sperm-as opposed to "AIH,"
artificial insemination using the husband's sperm.
56 MCCAHEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 1-59 (citing McGuire & Alexander,
Artificial Insemination of Single Women, 43 FERTILITY & STERILITY 182 (1985))
(questioning the basis for apprehension of some physicians that a child's lack of
a father might have adverse social, financial and cognitive effects).
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CONCLUSION
The law must be developed and applied in ways that respect the
families created by lesbian and gay people. Difficult and heart-
wrenching disputes over familial relationships are probably
impossible to prevent entirely, but the law can-and indeed
must-allow people to be able to order their lives in ways to avoid
such disputes when possible. To exclude lesbians from the
protections of DRL section 73, while at the same time they face
barriers to obtaining anonymously donated sperm, is to invite
conflict instead of reducing it. Families created by lesbian and gay
people deserve better.

